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Abstract We develop a general model of best response adaptation in large
populations for symmetric and asymmetric con°icts with role-switching.
For special cases including the classical best response dynamics and the
symmetrized best response dynamics we show that the set of Nash equilibria
is attracting for zero-sum games. For asymmetric con°icts and equally large
populations, convergence to a Nash equilibrium in the base game implies
convergence to a Nash equilibrium on the Wright manifold in the role game.
Journal of Economic Literature classi¯cation numbers: C72, D83.
Key words Role Games, Best Response Adaptation, Learning, Evolu-
tion.2 Ulrich Berger
1 Evolutionary Game Dynamics
Solution concepts from non-cooperative game theory, i.e. Nash equilibrium
and its re¯nements, form the essential basis of many economic models. It has
been shown, however, that very strong rationality and consistency assump-
tions are necessary to justify Nash equilibrium behavior. In recent years
another approach to behavior consistent with Nash equilibrium predictions
has been advocated by evolutionary game theorists. The idea is that social
or competition-based selection or learning processes guide the behavior of
individuals. The question then is, if in the long run this kind of evolution
leads to behavior corresponding to Nash equilibrium or a re¯nement thereof.
The most prominent deterministic dynamics in evolutionary game the-
ory is the replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978), which stems from
the biological sciences. The underlying assumption is that individuals are
programmed to some pure strategy which their o®spring inherits. The num-
ber of o®springs is determined by the success the strategy has when played
against other individuals. The dynamic equations arising from these as-
sumptions have been extensively studied, see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998)
or Weibull (1995). It can e.g. be shown that Nash equilibria are ¯xed points
for the replicator dynamics, stable ¯xed points are Nash equilibria, and
asymptotically stable ¯xed points are perfect Nash equilibria.
The replicator dynamics is undoubtedly a reasonable model in a bio-
logical context, but it is much less clear if it also appropriately expresses
evolution in a social or economic environment. Although it can be shown
to arise for special rules of imitation (BjÄ ornerstedt and Weibull, 1996, and
Schlag, 1998) or learning (BÄ orgers and Sarin, 1997), economists are inter-
ested in dynamic processes which allow for a greater variety of how strategies
are adjusted in populations of interacting agents. Classes of such alterna-
tive dynamics have been studied since the early 1990s, among them the
well known classes of payo® positive, weakly payo® positive, or payo® mono-
tonic dynamics, see Nachbar (1990), Friedman (1991) and Samuelson and
Zhang (1992). These are all so-called selection dynamics, which implies that
initially unused strategies in a population will never appear. Dynamic pro-
cesses for which the appearance of new strategies is not ruled out are called
innovative dynamics, examples are the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynam-
ics (see Berger and Hofbauer, 2002) and the more prominent best response
dynamics (Matsui, 1992). In this paper we concentrate on a generalization
of the latter, which is particularly appealing for asymmetric con°icts.
2 Best Response Dynamics
The best response dynamics arises as a continuous approximation of the
discrete ¯ctitious play learning process, which is due to Brown (1951) and
Robinson (1951). For a symmetric game with n pure strategies a sequenceA general model of best response adaptation 3
(x(t))t¸0 is a ¯ctitious play process, if x(0) is an element of the (n ¡ 1)-
dimensional probability simplex Sn and
x(t + 1) =
tx(t) + b(x(t))
t + 1
for t ¸ 0 and b(x(t)) 2 B(x(t));
where B(x) is the set of best responses to the empirical strategy distribution
x.
Originally this learning process was proposed as an algorithm for cal-
culating the value of a two-person zero-sum game. It is also known as the
standard learning process for boundedly rational, myopic agents. The def-
inition given above implies that each player plays a best response to the
empirical distribution of his opponent's past play.
Robinson (1951) proved that under ¯ctitious play the set of Nash equi-
libria is globally attractive for zero-sum games, and Miyasawa (1961) proved
convergence for 2£2-games under a particular tie-breaking rule. For games
with more than two strategies per player convergence need not occur, how-
ever (Shapley, 1964).





(Brown, 1951, see also RosenmÄ uller, 1971), and for the best response dy-
namics, which di®ers from this process only by a rescaling of time and
(suppressing the time variable) reads
_ x = b(x) ¡ x; b(x) 2 B(x): (1)
The analogous best response dynamics for an n£m bimatrix game is given
by
_ z = b(y) ¡ z; _ y = b(z) ¡ y; (2)
where (z;y) 2 Sn£Sm and b(:) 2 B(:).
The best response dynamics was introduced by Gilboa and Matsui (1991)
and Matsui (1992), and further analyzed by Hofbauer (1995). It is equiva-
lent to continuous ¯ctitious play, but its interpretation is rather di®erent.
The learning process interpretation of ¯ctitious play assumes that the same
two players play some game repeatedly. This interpretation of the ¯ctitious
play process has been criticized because of the inherent con°ict between its
rationality assumptions on the one hand (players calculate best responses)
and the implied disability of players to detect patterns like cycles.1 More-
over, convergence means convergence of the empirical distribution (beliefs),
not convergence of actual play. The usual interpretation of the best response
dynamics is immune to this kind of criticism, since it is based on the popu-
lation model of game theory.
1 See e.g. Fudenberg and Levine (1998) for a discussion.4 Ulrich Berger
3 The population model
The population model of game theory was already formulated by Nash
(1950) in his Ph.D. thesis (see Weibull, 1994, for a quotation). For symmetric
con°icts, this model assumes that there is a large population of agents. Pairs
of agents are drawn randomly from this population and are matched to play
some matrix game. Interactions may be anonymous, but also if they are not,
the chance to meet an opponent again in the near future is so low that it does
not pay to try to in°uence his behavior as it is common in repeated games of
two ¯xed players as e.g. the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Moreover,
each agent is so small compared to the population that he can safely neglect
the in°uence his strategy choice has on the average distribution of strategies
in the population and hence on the future behavior of other agents. In this
sense, myopic behavior is a plausible assumption. This is reminiscent of the
price-taker assumption in the analysis of competitive equilibrium.
The population model of the best response dynamics assumes that each
agent is bound to some ¯xed pure strategy, but every now and then a small
fraction of agents review their strategy. Reviewing agents choose some pure
best response to the average strategy in the population (in the opponent
population, if the con°ict is asymmetric). A slightly di®erent, but equiv-
alent, interpretation is that agents stick to their strategy for lifetime, and
in each period some randomly selected agents die (leave the population)
and some are born (enter the population), where each of the latter chooses
some pure best response. This average strategy x 2 Sn is called the strategy
pro¯le or state of the population.
4 Asymmetric Con°icts and Role Games
For asymmetric con°icts, the standard population model supposes that
there are two types of agents, corresponding to two large populations, and
in each period one agent is drawn at random from each population. Then
these agents are matched to play a bimatrix game with the agent from the
¯rst population as the row-player and the agent from the second population
as the column-player. Common examples iclude games between males and
females, buyers and sellers, or employers and employees.
The population models of symmetric and asymmetric con°icts do, how-
ever, not capture certain situations of interest. Imagine for example the
\crossing game": Pairs of car drivers meet randomly at some unruled cross-
ing. Both can either give way or drive on (with the well known conse-
quences). The con°ict seems to be symmetric, but the population model of
symmetric con°icts is not appropriate for this situation, because the drivers
can identify their player position in the game. One of the drivers comes from
the right, the other one from the left. Hence the drivers can also condition
their strategies on their player position, and this is obviously what they do
in real life. In most countries the one coming from the right drives on andA general model of best response adaptation 5
the other one gives way.2 Another scenario could be one where car drivers
randomly meet pedestrians wanting to cross the street. Car drivers can
again give way or drive on, while pedestrians choose between stepping on
the street and waiting until the car has passed. This looks like an asymmet-
ric con°ict, but note that in fact there is no such thing like a population of
pedestrians or a population of car drivers. Instead, there is only one popula-
tion of agents who are sometimes in the role of a pedestrian and sometimes
in the role of a car driver. Of course these agents must condition their choice
of action on their player position (their role) in the game.
In both these scenarios what is going on is that agents of the same type
meet and play a bimatrix game (which can be symmetric, however), where
they condition their strategies on their player position, or role, in the game.
With this speci¯cation of the interaction, the agents are playing what is
called a role game. A role game is a symmetric two player game based on
a bimatrix game. The extensive form of a (static) role game is shown in
Figure 1: With the ¯rst move, nature decides which player will play rows
(role 1) and which will play columns (role 2). After that, the two players
play the bimatrix game, which is called the base game, according to the
roles they have been assigned. In order to distinguish the strategies of the
players in the role game and the base game, we refer to the strategies in
the latter game as actions. Then a strategy of a player is a pair of actions,
one for each role he or she might be assigned. If there are n pure actions
available in role 1, and m pure actions in role 2, then there are nm pure
strategies in the role game.
The idea of constructing a role game from a bimatrix game already
appears (for zero-sum games) in the classical work of von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944). Selten (1980), Maynard Smith (1982), Weibull (1995),
and Binmore and Samuelson (2001) used it in an evolutionary context3.
The replicator dynamics was studied for role games with 2£2 base games
by Gaunersdorfer et al. (1991), see also Cressman et al. (2000) and Cressman
(2000) for related work, introducing the notion of a Wright equilibrium, i.e.
an equilibrium on the Wright manifold, which turns out to play an important
role also in our analysis. The best response dynamics for role games with
2£2 base games has been studied by Berger (2001), see also Berger (2002).4
Formally, let the base game be given by an n£m bimatrix game with
payo® matrices U1 and U2. Denote by zi the probability of pure action
i, then a mixed action of player 1 is given by the (column-) vector z =
(zi)1·i·n, which is an element of the n¡1 dimensional probability simplex
Sn. Similarly, a mixed action of player 2 is a vector y = (yj)1·j·m in Sm.
2 At least this is what they are expected to do.
3 Weibull (1995) uses the expression role-conditioned game for the role game,
and Binmore and Samuelson (2001) call it the role-completed game.
4 Unfortunately, the common method of local stability analysis via linearization
of the vector ¯eld fails for the best response dynamics, so results are available only




























































































i=1 i=1 i=2 i=2 j=1 j=2 j=2
j=1 j=2 i=2
Fig. 1 The extensive form of the role game for a base game with two actions per
player. In the base game, if player 1 chooses action i and player 2 chooses j, the
former's payo® is ai j and the latter gets bji. In the ¯rst move, player 1 is assigned
the roles 1 and 2 with probability 1=2 each.
With a little abuse of notation we will not distinguish between a pure action
i and the corresponding mixed action ei placing probability 1 on this pure
action. Let a dot denote the scalar product of two vectors, then the payo®s
to player 1 and 2 can be written as z¢U1y and y¢U2z, respectively.
The corresponding role game is a symmetric nm£nm game with payo®
matrix U. Denoting a pure strategy by the pair ij of pure actions it consists
of, the elements of this payo® matrix are given by uij;kl = (u1
il + u2
jk)=2. A
mixed strategy for the role game is represented by a vector x = (xij) in the
simplex Snm, and the payo® to strategy x against some strategy p is x¢Up.
Since by construction of the role game every pure strategy corresponds
to a unique pair of pure base game actions, we get a natural correspondence
between mixed strategies and pairs of mixed actions: Every mixed strategy





k=1 xkj. This means that z(x) and y(x) are just the marginal
distributions of x. If n ¸ 2 and m ¸ 2, the space of mixed strategies has
dimension nm¡1, which is greater than n+m¡2, the dimension of the space
of pairs of mixed actions. Geometrically, the set of strategies corresponding
to the same action pair (z;y) is the intersection of the simplex Snm with a
linear subspace of dimension (nm ¡ 1) ¡ (n + m ¡ 2) = (n ¡ 1)(m ¡ 1). If
we denote this set by X(z;y), then all the strategies x 2 X earn the same
payo® x¢Up = [z(x)¢U1y(p)+y(x)¢U2z(p)]=2 against some strategy p. This
yields (see also Berger, 2001, or Cressman et al., 2000)A general model of best response adaptation 7
Lemma 1 If x0 is a best response to x in the role game, then (z(x0);y(x0)) is
a best response5 to (z(x);y(x)) in the base game. If (z0;y0) is a best response
to (z;y) in the base game, then x0 is a best response to x in the role game,
for any x0 2 X(z0;y0) and x 2 X(z;y).
Since a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium of the role game is a strategy x
which is a best response to itself, and a Nash equilibrium of the base game
is a pair of actions (z;y) which is a best response to itself, it follows that
Lemma 2 If x is a Nash equilibrium of the role game, then (z(x);y(x)) is a
Nash equilibrium of the base game. If (z;y) is a Nash equilibrium of the base
game, then x is a Nash equilibrium of the role game for any x 2 X(z;y).
Note that the pre-image X(z;y) has dimension (n ¡ 1)(m ¡ 1) if and
only if z and y are completely mixed actions. If e.g. both are pure actions
(i;j), then the set X(i;j) is the singleton consisting of the corresponding
pure strategy ij of the role game.
The Wright manifold of the simplex Snm is the set W = fx 2 Snm :
xij = ziyjg. This manifold, originally stemming from the two-locus two-
alleles model of population genetics, consists of all mixed strategies where
the choices of actions for the two roles are independent. It connects the
vertices of the simplex Snm and intersects each pre-image X(z;y) in exactly
one point.
5 Role Switching and Best Response Adaptation
The usual interpretation of a static role game as in Figure 1 requires that
the two roles are randomly assigned to the agents after a pair has been
matched. This is natural for a one shot game, but it poses some di±culties
for the population model we have in mind. In the crossing game depicted
above the random assignment of roles might be acceptable, but in the driver-
pedestrian con°ict it is not. If you are a pedestrian, you stay a pedestrian,
at least for the next few minutes. The next morning you might take the car,
that is, you have switched your role. Likewise, an agent might on one day
be in the role of a buyer (leader, donor, etc.) and on the next day in the
role of a seller (follower, receiver, etc.). This kind of role switching has to be
modeled if we want a realistic picture of the dynamic process involved. The
easiest way to do this is to assume one type of agents, but two populations,
corresponding to the two roles, where pairs are formed by randomly drawing
one agent from each population. The idea that the role of an agent is not
¯xed can then be introduced by the assumption that every now and then
an agent switches his role, i.e. he changes to the other population.
We could in principle directly apply the best response dynamics to this
population model. However, in the usual formulation this dynamics seems
5 To shorten the notation we call a pair (z
0;y
0) a best response to a pair (z;y),
if z
0 is a best response to y and y
0 is a best response to z.8 Ulrich Berger
to be too in°exible to suit our model. Note that the best response dynamics
demands that an agent with the possibility to review his strategy has to re-
view both his actions at the same time. Recently, Cressman (2001, chapter
3.4.2) suggested an alternative version of best response dynamics for role
games. In this version, which he calls the symmetrized best response dynam-
ics, agents review their actions with probability 1=2 each.6 One can imagine
other speci¯cations of strategy reviewing. If, for example, it is costly to re-
view an action, and switching occurs only rarely, an agent might prefer only
to review the action he is currently using (his active action), and to leave
the currently unused (passive) action unchanged. He might also occasionally
decide not to review at all. We would like to be able to incorporate these
and other possibilities in our model. In the following we present a model
of best response adaptation and derive the dynamic equations guiding the
suggested evolutionary process. Let us state the exact assumptions of the
model, starting with discrete time steps for convenience.
6 The Model
There are two large populations of agents, populations 1 and 2, correspond-
ing to the two roles in the base game. The populations have N1 and N2
members, respectively. We assume N1 · N2 and denote the relative sizes
by w = N1=(N1 +N2) and 1¡w = N2=(N1 +N2). Each agent initially has
some pure strategy ij, meaning \play action i if in role 1 and action j if in
role 2". In period t, denote the fraction of agents in population 1 (called
1-agents) with strategy ij by x1
ij(t). For population 2, x2
ij(t) is de¯ned anal-
ogously, and xij(t) = wx1
ij(t) + (1 ¡ w)x2
ij(t) is the total fraction of agents
with strategy ij.
In each period t, K(t) · N1 agents are randomly drawn from each
population and switch to the other population, i.e. they switch their roles.
Note that the population sizes remain constant.
After that, k(t) · N1 agents are randomly selected from each population
and get the possibility to review their strategies. Each selected agent reviews
both his actions with probability p1, he reviews only his active action with
probability p2, only his passive action with probability p3, and he does not
review at all with probability p4 = 1¡p1¡p2¡p3. We assume that the four
probabilities are the same for all agents and all periods. Furthermore, we
can without loss of generality assume p4 = 0, because a positive probability
6 This interpretation is consistent with the dynamic equations he derives. Cress-
man's (2001) original formulation is that agents review only the action for their
\current role". It is, however, not quite clear what an agent's current role is, if
this role is assigned randomly during each matching. With a static role game,
the agent does not know what his role will be in the next interaction, and it is
hard to explain why he should review the action for the role he was assigned the
last time. The idea is easier to formulate in our framework and appears as an
important special case below.A general model of best response adaptation 9
of not reviewing if selected can be replicated by a lower selection probability
(lower k(t)). So we have p1 + p2 + p3 = 1.
An agent reviewing his active action chooses a pure best response to
the average active action in the other population, while when reviewing
his passive action, he chooses a pure best response to the average active
action in his own population.7 We assume that in the case of multiple best
responses to both action distributions a reviewing agent makes his choices
for the two roles independently. Furthermore, we assume that all agents use
the same (but arbitrary) tie-breaking rule.
Finally, M(t) · N1 agents are drawn randomly from each population
and matched. Each pair of agents plays the base game (U1;U2), with the
1-agent in the role of the row-player and the 2-agent in the role of the
column-player.
In the following notation we will sometimes suppress the time variable


















frequencies of the inactive actions in the populations. The respective total
frequencies are z = wz1 + (1 ¡ w)z2 and y = wy2 + (1 ¡ w)y1.
For convenience we use the same expression B(:) to denote the (mixed)
best response correspondences for action distributions z1, z2, y1, and y2.
Now consider the expected increase ¢x1
ij(t) = x1
ij(t + 1) ¡ x1
ij(t) from
period t to period t+1. First, there is an \in°ow" caused by role-switching
of Kx2
ij agents and a corresponding out°ow of Kx1
ij agents. Then consider
the change in x1
ij due to strategy-reviewing. In period t, each agent review-
ing his 1-action chooses some pure best response from B(y2). Analogously,
each agent reviewing his 2-action chooses a pure best response from B(z1).
Now take a single agent from population 1. We want to calculate the prob-
ability that he has strategy ij after reviewing has taken place. Denote the
probability that the agent chooses action i when reviewing his 1-action by
b1
iand the probability that he chooses j when reviewing his 2-action by b2
j.
These values depend on the tie-breaking rule, if the best responses are not
unique.
With probability (1 ¡ k=N1)x1
ij, the agent already has the strategy ij
and is not selected to review his strategy. With probability k=N1 he is
selected to review his strategy. In the latter case there are three ways to
proceed. With probability p1 the agent reviews both his actions and then
(by the independence assumption) with probability b1
ib2
j he chooses ij as
his new strategy. The second possibility is that he only reviews his 1-action
(probability p2) and chooses i (probability b1
i), but has previously had the
2-action j (probability y1
j). Finally, the agent may only review his 2-action
(probability p3) and choose j (probability b2
j), but has already been using
the 1-action i (probability z1
i ).
7 He knows that his passive action will only become active if he switches to the
other population, in which case he will play against a member of the population
he currently belongs to.10 Ulrich Berger
Averaging over all agents in population 1 and subtracting x1
ij(t) yields






































for population 2. Summing up over all i and all j, respectively, in (3) and
(4), it can be seen that the average distributions of actions in the two
populations behave according to
¢z1 = K
N1(z2 ¡ z1) + k
N1(1 ¡ p3)(b1 ¡ z1);
¢z2 = K
N2(z1 ¡ z2) + k
N2(1 ¡ p2)(b1 ¡ z2);
¢y2 = K
N2(y1 ¡ y2) + k
N2(1 ¡ p3)(b2 ¡ y2);
¢y1 = K
N1(y2 ¡ y1) + k
N1(1 ¡ p2)(b2 ¡ y1):
Going from discrete to continuous time, setting R(t) = K(t)N1+N2
N1N2 ,
r(t) = k(t)N1+N2
N1N2 (we assume that R(:) and r(:) are continuous and posi-
tive), we therefore get the following system of di®erential inclusions.
_ z1 2 (1 ¡ w) [R(z2 ¡ z1) + r(1 ¡ p3)(B(y2) ¡ z1)];
_ z2 2 w [R(z1 ¡ z2) + r(1 ¡ p2)(B(y2) ¡ z2)];
(5)
_ y2 2 w [R(y1 ¡ y2) + r(1 ¡ p3)(B(z1) ¡ y2)];
_ y1 2 (1 ¡ w) [R(y2 ¡ y1) + r(1 ¡ p2)(B(z1) ¡ y1)]:
The best response correspondences B(:) are upper-semicontinuous with
closed and convex values. Hence the existence of at least one solution through
each initial value, which is Lipschitz continuous and de¯ned for all positive
times, is guaranteed, see e.g. Aubin and Cellina (1984). However, multiple
solutions may exist if one of the involved best response sets is not a singleton.
Every solution can be written as a function t 7! (z1(t);z2(t);y2(t);y1(t)),
satisfying the system of di®erential equations
_ z1 = (1 ¡ w) [R(z2 ¡ z1) + r(1 ¡ p3)(b(y2) ¡ z1)];
_ z2 = w [R(z1 ¡ z2) + r(1 ¡ p2)(b(y2) ¡ z2)];
(6)
_ y2 = w [R(y1 ¡ y2) + r(1 ¡ p3)(b(z1) ¡ y2)];
_ y1 = (1 ¡ w) [R(y2 ¡ y1) + r(1 ¡ p2)(b(z1) ¡ y1)]:A general model of best response adaptation 11
for almost all t ¸ 0, where the functions t 7! b(:(t)) 2 B(:(t)) are measur-
able.
In the space of strategies this gives rise to a solution t 7! (x1(t);x2(t))
with
_ x1
ij = (1 ¡ w)[R(x2
ij ¡ x1
ij) +













for almost all t ¸ 0. Note that we can multiply the right hand side of (6)
and (7) with any continuous and positive function of t without changing
the shape of the orbits (this amounts to a rescaling of time). Allowing a
little abuse of notation this implies that we can choose r(:) arbitrarily (but
positive and continuous).
The average frequency xij of strategy ij in the set of all agents then
follows the dynamic equation
_ xij = w _ x1
ij + (1 ¡ w)_ x2
ij





i ) ¡ x1
ij ¡ x2
ij]:
Summing up over all i and j, respectively, yields
_ zi = w(1 ¡ w)r[(1 + p1)bi(y2) ¡ (1 ¡ p2)z2
i ¡ (1 ¡ p3)z1
i ];
(9)
_ yj = w(1 ¡ w)r[(1 + p1)bj(z1) ¡ (1 ¡ p2)y1
j ¡ (1 ¡ p3)y2
j]:
The next Lemma states, loosely speaking, that constant solutions of (5)
coincide with Nash equilibria of the base game.
Lemma 3 The constant function t 7! (z1;z2;y2;y1) is a solution of (5)
if and only if z1 = z2 = z¤ and y1 = y2 = y¤, where (z¤;y¤) is a Nash
equilibrium of the base game.
Proof See appendix.
Note that a solution starting at a Nash equilibrium is not necessarily
a constant one. For example, if there is a continuum of equilibria, we can
induce arbitrary movements of the orbits in this continuum by choosing
a proper selection b(y2(t)) and b(z1(t)) from the continuum. However, if
the base game has a unique Nash equilibrium, the constant solution is also
unique, and the equilibrium may be called a ¯xed point of (5).12 Ulrich Berger
7 Special Cases
The model described above is general enough to allow for a variety of behav-
ior patterns based on best response adaptation. In the following we de¯ne
two important special cases.
First we consider the case of complete symmetry. By complete symmetry
(CSY) we mean symmetry in population size, in reviewing probability, and
in initial conditions. More precisely,
(CSY): w = 1=2; p2 = p3; x1(0) = x2(0):
This is not meant to be a realistic description of initial conditions in a pop-
ulation model of asymmetric con°icts, it is de¯ned in this way for purely
notational purposes. To see why, note that since all agents use the same
tie-breaking rule, z2(t) = z1(t) implies that b(z2(t)) = b(z1(t)), and analo-
gously for the agents' 2-actions. Hence the behavior of the two populations
is identical (we suppress the superscripts 1 and 2 in such a case). Role-
switching becomes meaningless in this scenario, and the model is equivalent
to a model of two separate populations, where the passive actions never
come into use and the active actions are reviewed with probability p1 + p2.
On the level of actions this is nothing but the best response dynamics for
bimatrix games.8 Indeed, setting w = 1=2, p2 = p3 = (1 ¡ p1)=2, choosing
r(t) ´ 4=(1 + p1), and assuming initial symmetry, (6) reduces to (2).
On the level of strategies we can identify two known subcases. First,
with p1 = 1 the above scenario replicates the best response dynamics for
the role game. To see this, note that (CSY) with p1 = 1 and r(t) ´ 2 reduces
(7) to two identical di®erential equations of the form _ x = b(x) ¡ x. 9 The
speci¯cation p1 = 1 is justi¯ed e.g. if the costs of strategy adjustment are
extremely low. Second, for p1 = 0 (and r(t) ´ 4) we have p2 = p3 = 1=2,
and while the orbits are the same as with p1 = 1 at the level of actions, the
orbits in the state space of strategies look di®erent. They are given by the
dynamic equations
_ xij = (bi(y)yj ¡ xij) + (bj(z)zi ¡ xij);
which are Cressman's (2001) symmetrized best response dynamics. The re-
viewing probabilities of this dynamics may be justi¯ed if adjusting strategies
is costly and the rate of role-switching R is very high. This would mean that
agents prefer to review only one of their actions and choose each one with
8 As usual, if the bimatrix game is symmetric and we assume symmetry in initial
conditions, then also the case of the best response dynamics for matrix games (1)
is included.
9 The resulting dynamics is not exactly identical to the best response dynam-
ics for the role game, because the assumption of independence implies that a
completely mixed equilibrium of the role game is unstable as long as it is not a
Wright equilibrium. This, however, does not in°uence orbits along which points
of indi®erence between di®erent best responses for both actions are isolated.A general model of best response adaptation 13
probability 1=2, since they do not know which one will be active in their
next interaction.
As a second special case of our general model we de¯ne the case review
only active (ROA).
(ROA): p2 = 1:
As the name suggests, in this case all agents review only their active action.
This makes sense e.g. if adjusting strategies is costly and the rate of role-
switching is very low (agents can expect to stay in the same role for a long
time).
8 Asymptotic Behavior for Zero-Sum Games
A special case is given, if U2 = ¡(U1)T (the negative transpose of U1), i.e.,
if the base game is a zero-sum game. For such games we will show that in the
cases (ROA) or (CSY), the set of Nash equilibria is globally asymptotically
stable under (5).10 Convergence behavior for zero-sum games is especially
important for 2£2 games. While for generic 2£2 games convergence to
Nash equilibrium is not di±cult to show for the cases with one or two pure
equilibria, respectively, this is a nontrivial task for the cyclic case (with a
unique and completely mixed equilibrium). However, since in the cyclic case
the game can be shown to be strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game
(see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998)), this case is covered by our result. As a
consequence, for the class of generic 2£2 games, if (ROA) or (CSY), then
every solution converges to a Nash equilibrium.
For the cyclic 2£2 case, a typical orbit of (z1(t);y2(t)) and (z2(t);y1(t))
is shown in Figure 2.
Theorem 1 Let the base game be zero-sum. If (ROA) or (CSY), then both
(z1(t);y2(t)) and (z2(t);y1(t)) { and hence (z(t);y(t)) { converge to the set
of Nash equilibria.
To prove the stability of the Nash equilibrium set we construct a Ljapunov
function for solutions of (5). This function is a modi¯cation of the one used
by Hofbauer (1995). So let U2 = ¡(U1)T and consider the continuous func-
tion










The proof consists of combining the following four Lemmas.
Lemma 4 V is nonnegative and vanishes if and only if (z1;y2) and (z2;y1)
are Nash equilibria.
10 It follows easily that this result also holds for games which are strategically












Fig. 2 A typical orbit for a game of the Matching Pennies type. Here, the pa-
rameters are R = 2, r = 1, w = 1=2, and p2 = 1.
Proof See appendix.
Lemma 5 If (ROA) or (CSY), then V is nonincreasing along any solution
of (5).
Proof See appendix.
Lemma 6 If (ROA) or (CSY), then _ V = 0 implies that (z1;y2) is a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof See appendix.
Combining these three Lemmas and applying Ljapunov's argument shows
that (z1(t);y2(t)) converges to the set of Nash equilibria. It remains to prove
that the same holds for (z2(t);y1(t)).
Lemma 7 If (ROA) or (CSY), (z2(t);y1(t)) converges to the set of Nash
equilibria.
Proof See appendix.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
9 Convergence to the Wright manifold
Consider a base game which is zero-sum with a unique Nash equilibrium
(z¤;y¤). For (ROA) or (CSY) we have shown that both the active partA general model of best response adaptation 15
(z1;y2) and the passive part (z2;y1) of any solution of (5) converge to
(z¤;y¤). Since any solution of (5) corresponds to a solution of (7), it fol-
lows that x1 and x2 converge to the set X(z¤;y¤) of Nash equilibria of the
role game. If this set is a singleton, we know the distribution of role game
strategies in the long run. However, if it is not { and this is the case if e.g.
(z¤;y¤) is completely mixed, the question remains, which part of the equilib-
rium set is attractive. Subsequently we will show that if the populations are
equally large, i.e. w = 1=2, and there is an orbit converging to a base game
equilibrium, then the distribution of strategies along this orbit converges to
the Wright manifold, and hence to a Wright equilibrium. In the situation
described above, this means that all orbits converge to the (unique) Wright




Theorem 2 Let w = 1=2. If z1(t) and z2(t) converge to z¤ and y2(t) and





From Theorem 1 with (CSY) we can derive the result of Robinson (1951)
for continuous ¯ctitious play, or the equivalent result of Hofbauer (1995) for
the best response dynamics. Moreover, under the plausible assumption that
agents only review their active strategy (ROA), we can see that convergence
for zero-sum games continues to hold for di®erent population sizes, vary-
ing rates of role-switching and strategy-reviewing, and for arbitrary initial
distributions in both populations.
Theorem 2 is even more general. For the continuous ¯ctitious play pro-
cess, or, equivalently, the best response dynamics, which is covered by
(CSY), there are other well known convergence results, e.g. for generic 2£2
games (Miyasawa (1961)), weighted potential games (Monderer and Shap-
ley, 1996), or strongly dominance solvable games (Milgrom and Roberts,
1991). For all these classes of games, as a corollary of Theorem 2 we ob-
tain convergence to a Wright equilibrium. This is trivial if the attracting
base game equilibrium is in pure actions (every pure strategy equilibrium
is contained in the Wright manifold), but if the base game equilibrium is
completely mixed, there is a continuum of mixed Nash equilibria in the role
game, of which only the Wright equilibrium is attracting. In this sense, our
model with (ROA, w = 1=2) or (CSY) exhibits equilibrium selection. This
happens e.g. for games of the Matching Pennies type,11 and hence the result
of Berger (2001) is obtained as a simple corollary. With a little additional
11 The best response dynamics converges cyclically to the completely mixed equi-
librium in these games. Note, however, that according to Krishna and SjÄ ostrÄ om
(1998), for the best response dynamics cyclic convergence to a completely mixed
equilibrium is a nongeneric phenomenon if there are more than two pure actions
in both roles.16 Ulrich Berger
e®ort it can also be shown that the result for 4£4 zero-sum matrix games
of Berger (2002) follows from our analysis. Finally, for (CSY) and p1 = 0 it
can be seen that Theorem 2 recovers the result of Cressman (2001) for the
symmetrized best response dynamics. In this case all the coe±cients in (13)
are zero and hence, as observed by Cressman (2001), the Wright manifold is
attracting and invariant. From this we can infer even more. The behavior of
orbits in the base game is completely re°ected by the behavior of orbits on
the Wright manifold in the role game. For example if there is an attracting
Shapley polygon P in the base game, then there is a corresponding attract-
ing set X(P) \ W in the role game, a Shapley polygon embedded in the
Wright manifold.
11 Appendix
11.1 Proof of Lemma 3
The if-part is obvious, so let us assume there is a constant solution. Note that at
least one of the factors 1 ¡ p3 and 1 ¡ p2 is positive. From the ¯rst line of (5) it
can be seen that _ z
1 is the sum of two vectors, one pointing in the direction of z
2
and the other one pointing at b(y
2). Since this sum is zero, z
1 must lie (weakly)
between z
2 and b(y
2). However, from the second line of (5), the same is true vice
versa: z
2 must lie (weakly) between z
1 and b(y







1). Calling these variables z
¤ and y







¤) is a Nash equilibrium. u t
11.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Note that






























1) are Nash equilibria. In a zero-sum game,
Nash equilibria are interchangeable, and thus the above condition is equivalent to




1) are Nash equilibria. u t
11.3 Proof of Lemma 5





1)h. Note that along any solution of (5), V1(t) is absolutely
continuous as the maximum of absolutely continuous functions. Thus V1(t) is
di®erentiable almost everywhere. The same holds for V2;V3;V4, and so V itself is





1(t). Let t0 be a point of di®erentiability of these four functionsA general model of best response adaptation 17
as well as of V (t). Now let us take a closer look at the derivative of e.g. V1(t). Our
goal for the moment is to show that the derivative with respect to t of V1 at time
t0 can be written as _ V1(t0) = b(y
2(t0))¢U
1 _ y
2(t0). To this end, we have to show
that _ V1(t0) = e
i¢U
1 _ y
2(t0) for all pure actions i 2 B(y
2(t0)). The next paragraph
covers this part of the proof.
For any sequence tk ! t0; tk 6= t0 there is a sequence of pure actions ik 2
B(y
2(tk)). This sequence always has a constant subsequence, since the number of
available indices ik is ¯nite. Assume the constant subsequence is ic;ic;:::, then
we know that ic 2 B(y
2(t0)). It follows that



























2(t0)) is not a singleton, and there is another subsequence with a di®erent
limit id 2 B(y







2(t0). Now suppose that for some index id with id 2 B(y
2(t0)) there is no
sequence tk ! t0 with id 2 B(y
2(tk)) for all k. Then there is a neighborhood N
of t0, such that id is not a best response to y

















contradicting the fact that id is not a best response for such tk.
We have now proved that _ V1(t0) = e
i¢U
1 _ y
2(t0) for all i 2 B(y
2(t0)). Hence
also _ V1(t0) = b(y
2(t0))¢U
1 _ y
2(t0). Analogous considerations for _ V2; _ V3; and _ V4 yield
_ V1(t0) = b(y
2(t0))¢U
1 _ y




_ V3(t0) = b(y
1(t0))¢U
1 _ y




and we can ¯nally calculate
[r w(1 ¡ w)]
¡1 _ V = w
¡1( _ V1 + _ V2) + (1 ¡ w)
¡1( _ V3 + _ V4)





















































1 = 0: (11)18 Ulrich Berger
























1) · 0, so
also the ¯fth term is nonpositive. Considering the third term, we can see that this
term vanishes if either p2 = 1, i.e. (ROA), or (CSY).
Hence for (ROA) or (CSY) we have _ V · 0 for almost all t > 0 along any
solution of (5). u t
11.4 Proof of Lemma 6
For _ V = 0, the second and the fourth term of the sum in (10) must vanish. If
(ROA) then 1 ¡ p3 = 1 and a necessary condition for the second term to vanish





and only if (z
1;y
2) is a Nash equilibrium. If (CSY), then 1 ¡ p3 = 1 ¡ p2 > 0. By




1) is a Nash equilibrium. u t
11.5 Proof of Lemma 7
In case (CSY) this follows by de¯nition, so assume (ROA). If p2 = 1, the second
line of (5) reads _ z
2 = wR(z
1 ¡ z
2), that means _ z
2 points into the direction of z
1.
We know that z
1(t) converges to the 1-component of the Nash equilibrium set. Let





¤) 2 NEg. Analogously we de¯ne NE2. From the interchangeability of
Nash equilibria for zero-sum games it follows that NE = NE1£NE2. We also
know that NE is convex for zero-sum games, and so are the component sets of
NE. Assume z
2 is not in NE1 and let N be an open, convex neighborhood of NE1.
From convergence it follows that z
1(t) stays in N for large t. Since _ z
2 points into
the direction of z
1, it points to N for any large t. So let us assume that z
2 is not
in N and _ z
2 points to N, and let ^ z be the point in the closure of N which has
minimal distance to z
2 (this point exists, since N is convex). Denote by H the
hyperplane which contains ^ z and is perpendicular to ^ z ¡ z
2. This is a separating
hyperplane for the convex sets N and fz
2g. Since _ z
2 points to N, it also points
to H. Hence the distance between z
2 and N strictly decreases until z
2 reaches
N. Letting N shrink to NE1 yields the convergence of z
2(t) to NE1. Analogously,
y
1(t) converges to NE2, and hence (z
2(t);y
1(t)) converges to NE1£NE2 = NE.
u t
11.6 Proof of Theorem 2
Convergence to the Wright manifold is shown by invoking another Ljapunov func-
tion, which is based on the one used by Cressman (2001). Remember we denoted
the frequencies of the actions and strategies within the whole set of agents by
z = wz
1 + (1 ¡ w)z
2, y = (1 ¡ w)y
2 + wy
1, and x = wx





2) = ziyj ¡ xi j + C(zi ¡ z
¤
i )_ yj; (12)A general model of best response adaptation 19
with C = 4p1(1 + p1)
¡2, and subsequently we show that Li j(t) goes to zero for
every strategy ij. This means that x(t) converges to the Wright manifold. We
know that x(t) converges to X(z
¤;y
¤), hence it follows that x(t) converges to a
Wright equilibrium.
It su±ces to show that _ Li j(t) = ¡Li j(t) + Gi j(t) for almost all t > 0, with
Gi j(t) ! 0 for t ! 1. Thus we calculate
Gi j = _ Li j + Li j = _ ziyj + zi _ yj ¡ _ xi j +
+ C _ zi _ yj + C(zi ¡ z
¤
i )Ä yj + ziyj ¡ xi j + C(zi ¡ z
¤
i )_ yj:
Inserting from (8) and (9), Gi j can be written as



































i j + ¸2x
2
i j +
+ C _ zi _ yj + C(zi ¡ z
¤
i )(Ä yj ¡ _ yj):
Note that the last term of this sum is uniformly bounded for all t where the
derivatives exist. Setting r(t) ´ [2w(1 ¡ w)]
¡1, computing the coe±cients in (13)
for w = 1=2 yields
®1 = [(1 ¡ w)(1 + p1) ¡ p3]=2; ®2 = [w(1 + p1) ¡ p2]=2;
¯1 = [w(1 + p1) ¡ p3]=2; ¯2 = [(1 ¡ w)(1 + p1) ¡ p2]=2;
±1 = w(1 ¡ w) ¡ (p1 + p2)=2; ±2 = w
2 ¡ w(1 + p1)=2;
±3 = (1 ¡ w)
2 ¡ (1 ¡ w)(1 + p1)=2; ±4 = w(1 ¡ w) ¡ (p1 + p3)=2;
° = ¡p1; ¸1 = 1=2 ¡ w; ¸2 = w ¡ 1=2:
Note that
®1 + ®2 = ¯1 + ¯2 = p1
and
° = ±1 + ±2 + ±3 + ±4 = ¡p1:





i converge to z
¤
i , then so does zi, and analogously for yj. With a
little abuse of notation writing f ! g instead of f(t) ¡ g(t) ! 0(t ! 1), we can
therefore see that
Gi j ! (®1 + ®2)bi(y
2)y
¤






























j] + C _ zi _ yj



















u t20 Ulrich Berger
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